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MrcmGAN LAW REVIEW

. [Vol. 50

NEGLIGENCE-FORESEEABILITY As A LIMITATION ON LIABILITY-Plaintiff's
truck broke down on the road. Another truck driver, attempting to pass plaintiff's
truck, became mired beside it, and the two trucks blocked the road. While plaintiff lay under his truck attempting repairs, a bulldozer operated by the defendant
approached the two trucks from the rear." The driver of the second truck signaled
the defendant to push his, the mired truck, but the defendant, mistaking the
signal, pushed plaintiff's truck, causing it to run over plaintiff's legs. The defendant had not seen the plaintiff beneath the truck. The issue of defendant's
negligence was submitted to the jury, and verdict was for the plaintiff. On
appeal, held, affirmed. The issue of the defendant's negligence was properly for
the jury. McDonald v. Ferrebee, 366 Pa. 543, 79 A. (2d) 232 (1951).
The problem of the unforeseeable plaintiff arises when the defendant's conduct involves foreseeable risk to one party and results in injury to a plaintiff to
whom risk would not have been foreseen by a reasonable man. 1 In these cases,
two views exist as to the manner in which foreseeability will affect the defendant's liability.2 The Pennsylvania view holds that the defendant's negligent act
is the "proximate cause" of only the foreseeable consequences of such act.3 On
the other hand, the New York view holds that there is no "duty" toward a plaintiff unless injury to that plaintiff could have been foreseen.4 Since "foreseeability"
is a common limitation to defendant's liability, it would seem that under either
view the results ought to be the same.5 It is submitted, however, that the pro-

1 Goodhart, ''The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act," 39 YALE L.J. 449
(1930); PnossBn, TonTs 182 (1941); 38 AM. Jun., Negligence §58 (1941).
2 Liability for a negligent act may be limited by other methods, not considered here,
which do not involve foreseeability. PnossEn, TonTs 316 et seq. (1941).
3Wood v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 177 Pa. 306, 35 A. 699 (1896); Mellon v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 282 Pa. 39, 127 A. 444 (1925). Of course, when a "duty'' is accurately
defined, as in landlord-tenant relations, the absence of such duty will limit liability. Harris
v. Lewistown Trust Co., 326 Pa. 145 at 152, 191 A. 34 (1937).
4 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
5 "I suspect, for instance, that what I have called the Cardozo and Pennsylvania views
are really the same view except that the former emphasizes those factors in a case which
might indicate that the result of defendant's negligence was probable or foreseeable, whereas
the latter ignores those clues and looks only at the damage in light of normal expectancies."
Gregory, "Proximate Cause in Negligence - A Retreat from 'Rationalization,' " 6
Umv. Cm. L. RBv. 45 at 53 (1938). But it has been said that ". . • nearly all legal
theory in negligence cases is designed to serve the ends of allocating the power of judgment respectively to judge and jury." Green, ''The Palsgraf Case," 30 CoL. L. RBv.
789 at 798 (1930). In accord with the latter writer, it is believed that any distinction
must be found in the difference of allocation of function.
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cedural difference in determining "duty" as a question of law for the judge,6
and "proximate cause" as a question of fact for the jury7 may affect the substantive limits of liability. Considering the principal case as a problem of "duty,"
foreseeable risk to the property interest represented by the plaintiff's truck would
seem clear, but the "duty" of using due care to avoid personal injury would depend upon the foreseeable risk of personal harm to the plaintiff.8 This limitation,
though criticized as being a refinement too subtle for practical application,9 is
theoretically sound,10 and has gained recognition in the Restatement of Torts11
and in a few decided cases.12 As a question of law under the "duty" concept,
the diverse legal interests of person and property could be considered directly
and explicitly by the appellate court. On the other hand, when the question
of foreseeability takes the form of "proximate cause," as it did in the principal
case, and the jury determines it, review by the appellate court is indirect by the
unwieldy device of evaluating jury instructions. 13 Thus, in the principal case,
the question of whether the defendant should have foreseen the presence of the
plaintiff beneath the truck, having been decided by the jury, is not discussed.
A court using the "duty" concept, however, could find from the facts given that
foreseeable risk to the plaintiff's truck did not necessarily include foreseeable
risk to the plaintiff personally. The difference in method does not, of course,
necessarily predicate a different result, 14 but it is submitted that determination
by the judge, rather than by the jury, of whether a particular injury is foreseeable
has the practical effect of more accurately defining the limits of liability in that
the particular legal interests involved are explicitly examined as a question of
law.15

Frank Bowen, Jr.
6 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., supra note 4; Green, "The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases," 28 CoL. L. R:Ev. 1014 at 1022 (1928); but see O'Neill v. City of Port
Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423, 171 N.E. 694 (1930), holding that where varying inferences of the
risk creating the duty are possible the question is for the jury.
7 Helmick v. Township of South Union, 323 Pa. 433, 185 A. 609 (1936); PROSSER,
ToRTS 282 (1941).
s "There is room for argument that a distinction is to be drawn according to the
diversity of interests invaded by the act, as where conduct negligent in that it threatens an
insignificant invasion of an interest in property results in an unforeseeable invasion of an
interest of another order, as, e.g., one of bodily security." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
supra note 4.
9 Goodhart, "The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act," 39 YALE L.J. 449
at 467 (1930).
10 Tilley, "The English Rule as to Liability of Unintended Consequences," 33 MICH.
L. REv. 829 at 847 (1935).
11 2 TORTS RESTATEMENT §281 (1934).
12 Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Bigham, 90 Tex. 223, 38 S.W. 162 (1896); Excelsior
Insurance Co. of N.Y. v. State, 296 N.Y. 40, 69 N.E. (2d) 553 (1946).
13 Principal case at 234: "Defendants took only a general exception ••• to the error
which they now allege. Under these facts they cannot now be heard to complain."
14 Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. (2d) 213, 157 P. (2d) 372 (1945).
15 Jn a particular case, there may be no distinction, if, because of undisputed facts, the
question of "proximate cause" is taken from the jury. West Mahoney Township v. Watson,
116 Pa. 344, 9 A. 430 (1887).

